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Abstract
While we are performing a demanding cognitive task, not only do we have a sense of cogni-
tive effort, we are also subjectively aware that we are initiating, executing and controlling our
thoughts and actions (i.e., sense of agency). Previous studies have shown that cognitive
effort can be both detrimental and facilitative for the experienced sense of agency. We
hypothesized that the reason for these contradictory findings might lie in the use of differen-
tial time windows in which cognitive effort operates. The current study therefore examined
the effect of cognitive effort exerted on the current trial, on the previous trial or across a
block of trials on sense of agency, using implicit (Experiment 1) and explicit (Experiment 2)
measures of sense of agency. We showed that the exertion of more cognitive control on cur-
rent trials led to a higher explicit sense of agency. This surprising result was contrasted to
previous studies to establish potential reasons for this surprising finding and to formulate
recommendations for future studies.
Introduction
Intuitively, we all grasp the concept of cognitive effort. We all know what it is like to feel that a
cognitive task is demanding and effortful. However, defining cognitive effort is not straightfor-
ward [1]. Cognitive effort refers to the degree of engagement in demanding cognitive tasks, as
opposed to tasks that can be completed using routine or habitual behavior, which require little
effort. An influential neuroeconomics approach to effort postulates that deciding whether to
invest cognitive effort comes down to investigating the relevant costs and benefits (see for
example [1]). More specifically, several theories have proposed that effort may be primarily
implicated in the decision to engage cognitive control resources ([2–5]; for a review see [1]).
The broad concept of cognitive control comprises cognitive operations such as planning a
new strategy, evaluating it, controlling its execution and correcting possible errors. It kicks in
when routine activation of behavior is no longer sufficient for optimal performance [6]. Cogni-
tive control thus allows us to perform intelligent, purposive behavior. When performing basi-
cally any task or when we aim to achieve a goal, we need to stay focused and inhibit dominant,
yet irrelevant information to prevent being distracted from our task. Whenever an irrelevant
source of information interferes with our task performance, we will exert additional cognitive
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control in order to preserve task performance and resolve conflict. Conflict can be defined as
the simultaneous activation of incompatible representations [7]. In an experimental context,
conflict tasks such as the Eriksen flanker task are often used to measure cognitive control [8].
This task consists of a central target arrow flanked by distractor arrows. Congruent (i.e., flank-
ers and target point in the same direction) and incongruent (i.e., flankers and target point in
opposite directions) stimuli are presented and participants must indicate the direction of the
central target arrow as fast and as accurately as possible. Responses to incongruent trials are
slower and are more error prone than to congruent trials. This difference in performance
between incongruent and congruent trials constitutes the flanker effect. Here, dominant yet
task irrelevant stimuli (i.e., flanker arrows) need to be suppressed in order to perform this task
well.
When people encounter interference, such as conflict as defined above, cognitive control
allows them to adjust their behavior to overcome it. However, exerting cognitive control
comes at a cost and this is where cognitive effort comes in. The neuroeconomic theories treat
cognitive effort as the opportunity cost of exerting cognitive control (i.e., the decision to
expend cognitive control is accompanied by the missed benefit of avoiding effort; see [1] for a
review). Cognitive control usually drives cognitive effort and exerting more cognitive control
would lead to a higher effort cost.
While we are performing a demanding cognitive task, not only do we have a sense of cogni-
tive effort, we are also subjectively aware that we are initiating, executing and controlling our
thoughts and actions. The feeling of being in charge when we perform voluntary actions is
called the sense of agency [9]. The brain appears to actively construct the sense of agency using
motor actions, sensory feedback, previous experiences, cause-and-effect inferences, and so on
[10,11]. The core of sense of agency is the association between a voluntary action (e.g., pressing
a light switch) and an outcome (e.g., the light in the room goes on). Experimentally, sense of
agency can be explicitly measured by simply asking participants to judge whether their action
caused an outcome. Alternatively, implicit measures can be used, such as the compression of
perceived time between action and outcome [12]. In the intentional binding paradigm, partici-
pants judge the perceived time of a voluntary action or a subsequent outcome. It has been
shown that voluntary actions (as compared to involuntary movements) are perceived as shifted
in time towards their subsequent outcomes and that the outcomes are perceived as shifted
towards the voluntary actions that caused them. Based on this implicit measure, sense of
agency is defined as the compression (or underestimation) of the perceived time interval
between action and outcome.
Crucially, effort and sense of agency have been linked to each other, dating back even to the
19th century (for an overview see [13]). It has been argued that without the subjective experi-
ence of effort there could not be any feeling of agency or causality, but only mere facts of
behavior. According to this view, it is the conscious experience of effort that makes self-knowl-
edge possible. If effort is a crucial determinant of sense of agency, then experimental manipula-
tions of cognitive effort should also influence the accompanying sense of agency. A few studies
have shown that sense of agency can indeed be influenced by increased cognitive effort.
Howard et al. instructed participants to memorize two (low effort) or eight (high effort) let-
ters [14]. After encoding, a maintenance period started by a self-initiated action which ended
after a variable duration with an outcome (i.e., a tone). Participants’ estimation of the duration
of this maintenance period was used to measure intentional binding. The results showed that a
high cognitive effort context decreased intentional binding compared to a low cognitive effort
context. Similar results were obtained by Hon et al. [15] who used an explicit instead of an
implicit measure of sense of agency. Contrarily, Demanet et al. [16] observed increased inten-
tional binding in a high physical effort context. In the study of Sidarus and Haggard [17],
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participants responded to flanker trials (i.e., the action) which triggered the appearance of a
colored circle after a variable delay (i.e., the outcome). They judged how much control they felt
over the colored circles that were triggered by their actions. Results indicated that incongruent
flanker trials led to lower sense of agency compared to congruent and neutral flanker trials.
Vastano et al. reached the same conclusion using an implicit intentional binding measure of
sense of agency [18]. However, although Wang et al. [19] also found that sense of agency rat-
ings were lower for incongruent trials, this appeared to be the case only when the previous trial
was a congruent trial and thus did not contain conflict. Similarly, Di Costa et al. [20] observed
that sense of agency measured with intentional binding is increased after making an error.
Thus, previous studies have shown that cognitive effort can be both detrimental and facilita-
tive for the experienced sense of agency. We hypothesize that the reason for the nuances in
these findings might lie in the use of differential time windows in which cognitive effort oper-
ates. Indeed, the findings seem to depend on whether the effort that was taken into account
was exerted on the current trial, the previous trial or across a block of trials. When the current
trial contained a high level of effort (e.g., incongruent or error trial), sense of agency on that
trial decreased [17–19]. However, sense of agency seemed to be increased on trials following
high effort [19–20]. In contexts with high effort, the results are mixed: some studies found
increased sense of agency [16] while others observed decreased sense of agency [14–15].
Sidarus and Haggard [17] argued that when an increase of effort can be anticipated, the
required cognitive control and expected self-engagement in the task can become part of action
planning and prediction. In contrast, effort investment that is sudden and unexpected, for
example triggered by unexpected or unpredictable conflict, cannot be predicted and included
in action planning. Based on this, we speculate that when high effort is required unpredictably
or unexpectedly (e.g., on the current trial), sense of agency will decrease; contrarily, when high
effort is anticipated (e.g., after a conflict or in a high conflict context), it should be accompa-
nied by increased sense of agency. We formulated three specific hypotheses. First, in a block of
trials where effort is required unpredictably, encountering a high-effort trial will lead to a
decreased sense of agency on that same trial compared to a low-effort trial. Second, in a block
of trials where effort is required unpredictably, encountering a high-effort trial will lead to an
increased sense of agency on the next trial compared to a low-effort trial. Third, in a block of
trials where effort can be anticipated (i.e., frequent high-effort trials), sense of agency will be
increased compared to a block of trials where effort cannot be anticipated (i.e., scarce high-
effort trials).
In order to assess these hypotheses we will use a flanker task to manipulate conflict and
hence the required cognitive control and, in turn, the required effort (i.e., on congruent trials,
no conflict is present and thus the required cognitive control and the effort cost is minimal;
contrarily, on incongruent trials, conflict is present and thus the required cognitive control




Participants. Sixty participants were recruited through the Experiment Management Sys-
tem of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. They received course credit for participation. All
participants provided written informed consent. All of them had normal or corrected-to-nor-
mal eyesight, were not colorblind and were able to operate a keyboard and mouse. We used
the following exclusion criteria for participants: response times and/or intentional binding
exceeding 2.5 SD, and/or error rates above 20%. However, none of the participants met these
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exclusion criteria. Thus, all 60 participants were included for the analyses (6 males, mean
age = 18.52, SD = 1.13, range 18–26). This study was approved by the Social and Societal Ethics
Committee (SMEC) from KU Leuven (G-2019 01 1493). The study was also preregistered on
the Open Science Framework (OSF, osf.io; doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/EM3GQ) and the raw data
can be retrieved from https://osf.io/em3gq/ (doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/EM3GQ).
Apparatus. The experiment was administered in a computer room in small groups. Sti-
muli were presented on a 22” monitor with a refresh rate of 60 Hz located approximately 60
cm from the participant. Stimulus presentation and response registration were controlled by
PsychoPy v.3.1.0 (Psychology software for Python; [21]).
Design and procedure. The experiment was composed of active and passive trials. During
active trials an Eriksen flanker task [8] was used in which a string of numbers was presented in
white against a grey background in the center of the screen on each trial (font = Consolas,
height = 1.2 deg). A central target number was flanked by two distractor numbers on both
sides. Participants were instructed to respond as fast and as accurately as possible to the central
target arrow and to ignore the flankers. The flanker stimuli could either trigger the same
response as the target (i.e., congruent trials; e.g., “22222”), or trigger a different response as the
target (i.e., incongruent trials; e.g., “33233”). The stimuli used were 1, 2, 3 and 4 [22]. Partici-
pants had to respond by pressing the corresponding key (1, 2, 3 or 4) on an Azerty keyboard.
Specifically, the keys of interest were indicated by stickers: sticker of the number “1” was
placed on the “d” key, a “2” on the “f” key, a “3” on the “j” key and a “4” on the “k” key. To
speed up response time, participants were instructed to keep their left middle finger on the
“1”, their left index finger on the “2”, their right index finger on the “3” and right middle index
finger on the “4”. Active trials were announced by a white fixation cross (1000ms) that was fol-
lowed by the flanker stimulus until a response was provided. After a variable delay of between
500 and 1250ms (in steps of 250ms; [14]), a colored circle was presented on the screen for
200ms (size = (2, 2) deg). The color of the circle depended on the response made on the cur-
rent trial. Specifically, different colors were linked to passive trials (see below) and to button
presses on “1”, “2”, “3” and “4”, leading to five colors (i.e., RGB color space values of pink
[1.000, -1.000, 1.000], yellow [1.000, 1.000, -1.000], cyan [-1.000, 1.000, 1.000], orange [1.000,
0.000, -1.000] and blue [-1.000, -1.000, 1.000]). Thus, on active trials an action (i.e., a button
press) triggered the appearance of a colored circle, whereas on passive trials no action triggered
the appearance of a colored circle. Note that we avoided the use of green and red to prevent
any associations with correct/incorrect connotations. Which color was related to which
response was randomized across participants. After the disappearance of the circle, partici-
pants performed an Interval Reproduction Task [23] in which they reported the estimated
length of the delay between the disappearance of the flanker stimulus and the appearance of
the circle. They responded by continuously pressing the space bar for the estimated duration.
For a schematic overview of an active trial, see Fig 1.
During passive trials a string of neutral stimuli (i.e., “00000”) was presented in black against
a grey background in the center of the screen. Participants were instructed that these trials did
not require a response. As participants did not respond to these stimuli, they were therefore
non-agentic [14]. If participants did respond to a passive trial, this was registered as an error.
Passive trials were announced by a black fixation cross (1000ms) followed by a neutral stimu-
lus (i.e., “00000”) that was presented for a duration jittered between 500 and 1500ms. After a
variable delay of between 500 and 1250ms a colored circle was again presented. Next, partici-
pants again had to perform the Interval Reproduction Task in which they estimated and repro-
duced the length of the delay between the neutral stimulus disappearance and the circle
appearance. For a schematic overview of a passive trial, see Fig 1. Note that on passive trials
both the fixation cross and the neutral stimulus were presented in a different color (i.e., black)
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compared to the active trials (i.e., white) to make the non-agentic nature of these trials very
clear to the participants.
The experiment started with several practice phases. First, participants received the instruc-
tions about the active trials and practiced only the flanker task for 10 trials (five congruent and
five incongruent trials). Next, instructions were provided about the presence of the passive tri-
als and participants practiced this on 10 trials where both active and passive trials were pre-
sented (six passive, two congruent and two incongruent trials). During these two practice
phases, participants received feedback about their responses (i.e., “correct” or “wrong” and
their response time in seconds). After this, participants were informed that a circle would
appear after the disappearance of the flanker or neutral stimulus and that the color of this circle
would depend on their response. They received instructions about the Interval Reproduction
Task. Finally, they were also told that after each block they would receive a few additional ques-
tions. The first question assessed the level of experienced effort after each block (i.e., “how
much effort did you have to exert during the previous block?”). Three additional questions
assessed the subjective feeling of agency over congruent, incongruent and passive trials, respec-
tively, during the previous block. For each type of trial (e.g., congruent trials), the trials were
listed on the screen (e.g., 11111, 22222, 33333 and 44444) and participants were asked: “To
what extent did you have the feeling that you caused the colored circle to appear on the follow-
ing trials?”. For all of these post-block questions, participants indicated their response using a
continuous rating scale ranging from “very little” to “a lot” by a mouse button click on the
selected location on the rating scale. In a final practice block, they practiced the full procedure
for 10 trials (4 passive, 3 congruent and 3 incongruent trials).
After these practice phases, the experimental phase began where feedback was no longer
provided. Active and passive trials were presented intermixed and the inter-trial interval was
1000ms. Experimental trials were divided into three blocks, each containing 216 trials. The
blocks varied depending on the ratio of incongruent, congruent, and passive trials: one block
with ratio 4:1:1 (i.e., MI block), one with ratio 1:4:1 (i.e., MC block), and one 5:5:2 (i.e., EQ
block) ratio of incongruent to congruent to passive trials. The block that had mostly incongru-
ent trials (MI block) served as the high effort context and the bock that had mostly congruent
trials (MC block) served as the low effort context [24]. The block with an equal ratio of
congruent and incongruent trials (EQ block) served as the block where effort was required
Fig 1. Example of an active (top) and passive (bottom) trial in Experiment 1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.g001
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unpredictably, to assess the impact of current and previous trial effort on sense of agency. The
order of trials in each block was randomized. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced
across participants. Finally, after each block, participants received the additional questions to
assess exerted effort and experienced agency over each trial type, as described above. In
between blocks, participants could take a self-paced break. The whole experiment did not take
more than one hour. The experiment was followed by a short debriefing explaining the goal of
the study.
Statistical analysis. Active trials exceeding 2.5 SD of the overall mean RT were excluded
from all analyses (1.7% of trials). For RT and intentional binding analyses, erroneous flanker
trials were removed (5.9% of trials). For trial-by-trial analyses assessing hypotheses 1 and 2, the
first trial (0.46% of trials) and trials following an erroneous flanker trial (5.8% of trials) were
also excluded in the EQ block. No trials met our exclusion criterion with regards to intentional
binding (i.e., trials exceeding 2.5 SD of the overall mean intentional binding).
First, we calculated the measure of intentional binding for active and passive trials based on
the Interval Reproduction Task. Specifically, for active trials, the participant’s estimated delay
(in milliseconds) was subtracted from the actual delay between their response on the flanker
stimulus (i.e., response) and the appearance of the colored circle (i.e., outcome) for each trial
(i.e., actual delay—estimated delay). For the passive trials, we subtracted the participant’s esti-
mated delay from the actual delay between the disappearance of the neutral stimulus and the
appearance of the colored circle for each trial. Note that a value of zero indicates a perfect esti-
mate, and hence no intentional binding. Positive values indicate an underestimation of the
time period, and thus intentional binding. As a control check, we assessed whether our manip-
ulation of intentional binding was successful by looking at the difference in average attentional
binding between active (i.e., congruent and incongruent) and passive trials using a paired-
samples t-test. If our task was indeed successful in eliciting intentional binding, we should
observe that intentional binding in active trials was larger than in passive trials (where no
action is present). Note that comparing active (i.e., action) and passive (i.e., no-action) trials is
an established paradigm in this field (e.g., [23,25,26]).
Second, to test hypotheses 1 and 2, we focused on the EQ block where effort is required
unpredictably (i.e., equal proportion of incongruent and congruent trials). For hypothesis 1,
we examined whether encountering a high-effort trial leads to a decreased sense of agency on
that same trial compared to a low-effort trial. For hypothesis 2, we examined whether encoun-
tering a high-effort trial leads to an increased sense of agency on the next trial compared to a
low-effort trial. We conducted a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA analysis with Current and
Previous trial congruency as within-subjects factors (both with 2 levels: congruent and incon-
gruent) on intentional binding (in ms), RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) as (separate) depen-
dent variables.
Third, to test hypothesis 3, we examined whether sense of agency was increased in a block
of trials where effort can be anticipated (i.e., MI block), compared to a block of trials where
effort cannot be anticipated (i.e., MC block). For this purpose, a block analyses was conducted.
We performed a 2x2 repeated measures analysis with Block (2 levels: MC and MI) and Current
trial congruency (2 levels: congruent and incongruent) as within-subjects factors on inten-
tional binding, RTs and error rates as (separate) dependent variables.
Note that in the analyses described above, we did not pool all trials across blocks to assess
the general effect of current trial congruency on intentional binding. As the different contexts
that were created by manipulating the proportion of congruent trials (i.e., EQ, MC and MI)
trigger different cognitive control mechanisms, and hence differential congruency effects (see
for example [22]), we a priori decided not to pool across blocks. However, an additional
exploratory repeated measures analysis across all blocks with current trial congruency as
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within-subjects factor revealed that the main effect of congruency on intentional binding was
not significant (F(1,59) = 0.58, p = .46, η2p = 0.010).
Finally, we looked at the subjective ratings of experienced sense of agency and cognitive
effort reported after each block for exploratory purposes. We conducted a repeated measures
analysis with block (3 levels: EQ, MC or MI) as within-subjects factor on the reported experi-
enced effort after each block and a repeated measures analysis with trial type (3 levels: congru-
ent, incongruent or passive) as within-subjects factor on the reported explicit sense of agency
after each block.
Results
Intentional binding check. A paired-samples t-test confirmed that intentional binding
was larger on active compared to passive trials (407 versus 293ms, t(59) = -7.41, p< .001). This
ensures that our implicit measurement of sense of agency was successful. Table 1 presents the
participants’ average estimated delays as a function of block and actual delay (i.e., 500, 750,
1000 or 1250ms) for the correct active trials (excluding trials exceeding 2.5 SD of the overall
mean RT) and the passive trials.
Trial-by-trial analyses. These analyses were conducted on the EQ block. We conducted a
2x2 repeated measures analysis with Current and Previous trial congruency as within-subjects
factors (both with 2 levels: congruent and incongruent) on intentional binding (in ms), RTs
(in ms) and error rates (in %) as (separate) dependent variables. Means and SDs for each of
these dependent variables in relation to current and previous congruency are reported in
Table 2. The results are also depicted on Fig 2.
With regard to intentional binding, we found no significant main effects of current or previ-
ous congruency (resp. F(1,59) = 0.15, p = .70, η2p = 0.003 and F(1,59) = 0.011, p = .92, η2p <
0.001), nor a significant interaction (F(1,59) = 0.16, p = .69, η2p = 0.003). This indicates that we
observed no difference in intentional binding depending on current or previous congruency.
Table 1. Means (SD) for the estimated delays (in ms) in relation to block (EQ, MC, MI) and actual delay (500, 750, 1000 or 1250ms) for the active and passive trials.
Active trials Passive trials
Block Block
EQ MC MI EQ MC MI
Actual delay (ms) 500 365 (199.04) 381 (215.30) 362 (202.69) 451 (243.92) 442 (245.64) 462 (252.36)
750 431 (226.34) 435 (228.86) 418 (219.39) 521 (271.00) 542 (281.28) 541 (287.26)
1000 497 (253.58) 497 (267.92) 473 (245.68) 612 (319.79) 635 (298.32) 609 (326.32)
1250 580 (296.26) 578 (296.13) 577 (296.99) 708 (369.62) 735 (368.97) 712 (378.26)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.t001
Table 2. Means (SD) for intentional binding (in ms), RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in relation to current and previous congruency (trial-by-trial analyses).
Previous—Current trial congruency
CC CI IC II
Binding 404 (180.10) 404 (169.50) 407 (178.75) 402 (177.13)
RT 659 (105.95) 729 (101.25) 670 (93.91) 710 (102.41)
Error rates 4.41 (4.20) 7.83 (6.18) 4.38 (3.91) 6.94 (6.10)
CC: congruent previous trial and congruent current trial; CI: congruent previous trial and incongruent current trial; IC: incongruent previous trial and congruent
current trial; II: incongruent previous trial and incongruent current trial.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.t002
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With regard to RT, we found a significant main effect of current congruency (F(1,59) =
90.65, p< .001, η2p = 0.61) indicating that participants were slower on incongruent compared
to congruent trials (on average 719.5ms versus 664.5ms). Additionally, we observed a signifi-
cant interaction between current and previous congruency (F(1,59) = 8.85, p = .004, η2p =
0.13). This interaction reflects a typical Gratton effect: a decreased congruency effect after an
incongruent compared to a congruent trial (40ms versus 70ms). The observation of this Grat-
ton effect ensures that our manipulation of current and previous congruency was successful in
order to trigger trial-by-trial adaptations. The main effect of previous congruency did not
reach significance (F(1,59) = 0.95, p = .33, η2p = 0.016).
With regard to error rates, we only observed a significant main effect of current congruency
(F(1,59) = 21.56, p< .001, η2p = 0.27) indicating that participants made more errors on incon-
gruent compared to congruent trials (on average 7.38% versus 4.39%). The main effect of pre-
vious congruency and the interaction between current and previous congruency did not reach
significance (resp. F(1,59) = 1.32, p = .26, η2p = 0.022 and F(1,59) = 0.77, p = .38, η2p = 0.26).
As an exploratory analysis that was not included in our preregistration, we additionally
conducted a 4x2x2 repeated measures analysis with Actual delay (4 levels: 500, 750, 1000 or
1250ms), Current and Previous trial congruency (both with 2 levels: congruent and incongru-
ent) as within-subjects factors on intentional binding (in ms). We only observed a main effect
of Actual delay (F(3,56) = 285.67, p< .001, η2p = 0.94), with more intentional binding for lon-
ger delays (specifically, 132.5, 313, 501 and 670ms for the increasing delays). None of the other
main effects or interactions reached significance.
Block analyses. These analyses were conducted on the MC and MI blocks. We con-
ducted a 2x2 repeated measures analysis with Block (2 levels: MC and MI) and Current trial
congruency (2 levels: congruent and incongruent) as within-subjects factors on intentional
binding (in ms), RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) as (separate) dependent variables. Means
and SDs for each of these dependent variables in relation to current and previous congruency
are reported in Table 3. The results are also depicted on Fig 3.
With regard to intentional binding, we found no significant main effect of congruency (F
(1,59) = 1.56, p = .22, η2p = 0.026), nor a significant interaction between block and congruency
(F(1,59) = 0.048, p = .83, η2p = 0.001). The main effect of block also did not reach significance,
but showed a slight trend (F(1,59) = 3.00, p = .089, η2p = 0.048). Indeed, we observed slightly
more binding in the MI compared to the MC block, as hypothesized (419.5 versus 398.5ms).
Fig 2. Intentional binding (left panel), RTs (middle panel) and error rates (right panel) of Experiment 1 as a
function of previous congruency and current congruency. Dots represent mean RTs for each participant in each
condition (thus, each participant is depicted four times on this graph, once for each Previous × Current Congruency
condition). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.g002
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With regard to RT, we found a significant main effect of congruency (F(1,59) = 286.29, p<
.001, η2p = 0.83) indicating that participants were slower on incongruent compared to congru-
ent trials (on average 738ms versus 671.5ms). Additionally, we observed a significant interac-
tion between block and congruency (F(1,59) = 45.80, p< .001, η2p = 0.44). This interaction
reflects a typical proportion congruency effect: a decreased congruency effect in an MI block
compared to an MC block (44ms versus 89ms). The observation of this proportion congruency
effect ensures that our manipulation of block was successful in order to trigger blockwise adap-
tations. The main effect of block did not reach significance (F(1,59) = 0.056, p = .81, η2p =
0.001).
With regard to error rates, we observed a significant main effect of congruency (F(1,59) =
31.93, p< .001, η2p = 0.35) indicating that participants made more errors on incongruent
compared to congruent trials (on average 7.80% versus 4.77%). A main effect of block was also
observed (F(1,59) = 10.91, p = .002, η2p = 0.16), indicating that participants made more errors
on the MC block compared to the MI block (7.17% versus 5.40%). Finally, the interaction
between block and congruency also reached significance (resp. F(1,59) = 1.32, p = .26, η2p =
0.022), again indicating a proportion congruency effect: a decreased congruency effect in an
MI block compared to an MC block (1.38% versus 4.68%).
As an exploratory analysis that was not included in our preregistration, we additionally
conducted a 4x2x2 repeated measures analysis with Actual delay (4 levels: 500, 750, 1000 or
1250ms), Block (2 levels: MC and MI) and Congruency (2 levels: congruent and incongruent)
as within-subjects factors on intentional binding (in ms). We only observed a main effect of
Fig 3. Intentional binding (left panel), RTs (middle panel) and error rates (right panel) of Experiment 1 as a
function of Block and current congruency. Dots represent mean RTs for each participant in each condition (thus,
each participant is depicted four times on this graph, once for each Block × Current Congruency condition). Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.g003
Table 3. Means (SD) for intentional binding (in ms), RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in relation to block and current congruency (block analyses).
Block—Current trial congruency
MC_C MC_I MI_C MI_I
Binding 402 (178.24) 395 (182.27) 422 (159.70) 417 (167.78)
RT 659 (97.38) 748 (106.66) 684 (97.61) 728 (101.94)
Error rates 4.83 (3.59) 9.51 (8.62) 4.71 (4.16) 6.09 (3.61)
MC_C: congruent trial in an MC block; MC_I: incongruent trial in an MC block; MI_C: congruent trial in an MI block; MI_I: incongruent trial in an MI block.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.t003
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Actual delay (F(3,56) = 372.89, p< .001, η2p = 0.95), with more intentional binding for longer
delays (specifically, 128, 328, 518.5 and 682ms for the increasing delays). None of the other
main effects or interactions reached significance.
Post-block subjective effort and agency analyses. With regard to subjective effort experi-
enced during each block (EQ, MC or MI), we conducted a repeated measures analysis with
block (3 levels: EQ, MC or MI) as within-subjects factor on the reported experienced effort
after each block. We observed no significant differences between the three blocks (F(2,58) =
0.14, p = .87, η2p = 0.005). Indeed, the reported experienced effort was very similar in the EQ,
MC and MI blocks (resp. 6.44, 6.53 and 6.36).
With regard to the subjective sense of agency experienced for congruent, incongruent and
passive trials, we conducted a repeated measures analysis with trial type (3 levels: congruent,
incongruent or passive) as within-subjects factor on the reported explicit sense of agency after
each block. We observed significant differences between the experienced agency over congru-
ent, incongruent and passive trials (F(2,58) = 16.83, p< .001, η2p = 0.37). Specifically, partici-
pants reported a higher sense of agency over incongruent trials (4.81) compared to congruent
(4.2, F(1,59) = 24.61, p< .001, η2p = 0.29) or passive trials (4.1, F(1,59) = 7.98, p = .006, η2p =
0.12). The explicit sense of agency did not differ between congruent and passive trials (4.1,
F(1,59) = 0.12, p = .73, η2p = 0.02). Note that this effect did not interact with block: a repeated
measures analysis with trial type (3 levels: congruent, incongruent or passive) and block (3
levels: EQ, MC or MI) as within-subjects factors again only revealed a main effect of trial type
(F(2,58) = 16.83, p< .001, η2p = 0.37).
Discussion
Experiment 1 confirmed that our manipulation of cognitive control was successful: incon-
gruent trials led to a slower and more erroneous response than congruent trials (i.e., flanker
effect). After an incongruent trial, participants also increased their exertion of cognitive con-
trol compared to after a congruent trial (i.e., Gratton effect). Finally, when conflict could be
anticipated (i.e., MI block), the flanker effect was reduced (i.e., proportion congruency
effect). Our implicit intentional binding measure also seemed to be successful: participants
reported shorter time intervals on active trials compared to passive trials. However, we were
unable to confirm the results of previous studies: we observed no decrease in binding on
incongruent trials, nor an increase in binding after incongruent trials. We did observe a slight
trend towards increased binding in a context where conflict could be anticipated (i.e., MI
block).
Interestingly, our explicit measure of sense of agency, administered after each block, did
indicate that participants experienced more agency over incongruent trials than over congru-
ent trials. According to the two-step account of agency, the implicit and explicit approaches to
measure sense of agency, capture separate aspects of the sense of agency, namely the implicit
feeling of agency and the explicit judgement of agency [27,28]. The implicit feeling of agency
stems from a low-level comparator involving motor action planning and prediction, and sen-
sory feedback processes. The explicit judgement of agency relies on higher-order causality
judgements based on contextual factors and beliefs [29]. Furthermore, although correlations
between intentional binding and subjective sense of agency have been reported [26], whether
binding truly reflects sense of agency is debated [30,31]. Based on this, we decided to conduct
the experiment again, but now using an explicit measure of sense of agency on each trial (see
also [17]).
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Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Sixty participants were recruited from the Experiment Management System
of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. They received course credit or a monetary reward for
participation. All participants provided written informed consent. None of the them had par-
ticipated in Experiment 1. All of them had normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight, were not
colorblind and were able to operate a keyboard and mouse. We used the following exclusion
criteria for participants: response times and/or error rates above 20%. Two participants did
not meet these criteria based on their response time. Thus, 58 participants were included for
the analyses (9 males, mean age = 20.67, SD = 4.57, range 17–40). This study was approved by
the Social and Societal Ethics Committee (SMEC) from KU Leuven (G-2019 05 1652). The
study was also preregistered on OSF (osf.io; doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/EM3GQ) and the raw data
can be retrieved from https://osf.io/em3gq/ (doi: 10.17605/OSF.IO/EM3GQ).
Apparatus, design, procedure and statistical analyses. The apparatus, design and proce-
dure were identical to Experiment 1, except for the following changes. Instead of using an
implicit measure of sense of agency, as we did in Experiment 1 (i.e., intentional binding based
on the Interval Reproduction Task), we now used an explicit measure of sense of agency. Spe-
cifically, after the disappearance of the colored circle, participants now had to indicate their
explicit sense of agency (i.e., “I felt like I caused the circle to appear”) using a 9-point scale
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” [17]. This was the case for both active and
passive trials. For a schematic overview of both trial types, see Fig 4. Statistical analyses were
also the same as in Experiment 1, except that this explicit sense of agency was now used as
dependent variable instead of intentional binding.
Note that, as explained in Experiment 1, we did not pool all trials across blocks to assess the
general effect of current trial congruency on sense of agency ratings. However, an additional
exploratory repeated measures analysis across all blocks with current trial congruency as
within-subjects factor revealed that the main effect of congruency on sense of agency ratings
was not significant (F(1,57) = 1.81, p = .18, η2p = 0.031).
Active trials exceeding 2.5 SD of the overall mean RT were excluded from all analyses (i.e.,
1.9%). For RT and intentional binding analyses, erroneous active flanker trials were removed
Fig 4. Example of an active (top) and passive (bottom) trial in Experiment 2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.g004
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(i.e., 4.5%). For trial-by-trial analyses assessing hypotheses 1 and 2, the first trial of the block
(0.46%) and trials following an erroneous flanker trial (i.e., 3.8%) were also excluded in the EQ
block. For one participant, the sense of agency and effort ratings after each block were not
recorded. Therefore, this participant was excluded from the post-block analyses.
Results
Sense of agency rating check. A paired-samples t-test confirmed that the reported sense
of agency was larger on active compared to passive trials (5.51 versus 2.56ms, t(57) = -9.79, p
< .001). This ensures that our explicit measurement of sense of agency was successful. Table 4
presents the participants’ sense of agency ratings as a function of block and delay (i.e., 500,
750, 1000 or 1250ms) for the correct active trials (excluding trials exceeding 2.5 SD of the over-
all mean RT) and the passive trials.
Trial-by-trial analyses. These analyses were conducted on the EQ block. We conducted a
2x2 repeated measures analysis with Current and Previous trial congruency as within-subjects
factors (both with 2 levels: congruent and incongruent) on sense of agency (score on a scale
from 1 to 9), RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) as (separate) dependent variables. Means and
SDs for each of these dependent variables in relation to current and previous congruency are
reported in Table 5. The results are also depicted on Fig 5.
With regard to sense of agency, we found no significant main effect of previous congruency
(F(1,57) = 0.045, p = .83, η2p = 0.001), nor a significant interaction (F(1,57) = 0.16, p = .69, η2p
= 0.003). The main effect of current congruency was not significant, but showed a trend (F
(1,57) = 3.29, p = .075, η2p = 0.055): incongruent trials received a slightly higher agency rating
than congruent trials (5.51 versus 5.39).
With regard to RT, we found a significant main effect of current congruency (F(1,57) =
41.57, p< .001, η2p = 0.42) indicating that participants were slower on incongruent compared
Table 5. Means (SD) for sense of agency (rating from 1 to 9), RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in relation to current and previous congruency (trial-by-trial
analyses).
Previous—Current trial congruency
Means (SD) CC CI IC II
Sense of Agency 5.38 (2.73) 5.51 (2.66) 5.40 (2.71) 5.51 (2.65)
RT 727 (165.33) 810 (182.57) 730 (140.70) 790 (173.53)
Error rates 4.67 (4.74) 4.68 (4.66) 4.22 (3.76) 4.79 (3.81)
CC: congruent previous trial and congruent current trial; CI: congruent previous trial and incongruent current trial; IC: incongruent previous trial and congruent
current trial; II: incongruent previous trial and incongruent current trial.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.t005
Table 4. Means (SD) for the sense of agency ratings (score between 1–9) in relation to block (EQ, MC, MI) and delay (500, 750, 1000 or 1250ms) for the active and
passive trials.
Active trials Passive trials
Block Block
EQ MC MI EQ MC MI
Actual delay (ms) 500 5.68 (2.90) 5.70 (2.92) 5.85 (2.82) 2.53 (2.66) 2.62 (2.68) 2.53 (2.63)
750 5.43 (2.91) 5.64 (2.86) 5.53 (2.79) 2.46 (2.60) 2.58 (2.63) 2.68 (2.78)
1000 5.43 (2.92) 5.47 (2.90) 5.45 (2.82) 2.57 (2.68) 2.41 (2.42) 2.50 (2.66)
1250 5.16 (2.92) 5.32 (2.93) 5.36 (2.79) 2.71 (2.84) 2.58 (2.67) 2.42 (2.68)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.t004
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to congruent trials (on average 800ms versus 728.5ms). The main effect of previous congru-
ency did not reach significance (F(1,57) = 0.75, p = .39, η2p = 0.013). We also did not observe a
significant interaction between current and previous congruency (F(1,57) = 1.82, p = .18, η2p =
0.031). This implies that we did not observe a typical Gratton effect: the congruency effect was
not significantly decreased after an incongruent compared to a congruent trial (60ms versus
83ms).
With regard to error rates, we observed no significant effects (all p> .55).
As an exploratory analysis that was not included in our preregistration, we additionally
conducted a 4x2x2 repeated measures analysis with Delay (4 levels: 500, 750, 1000 or 1250ms),
Current and Previous trial congruency (both with 2 levels: congruent and incongruent) as
within-subjects factors on sense of agency ratings (score between 1–9). We observed a main
effect of Actual delay (F(3,55) = 3.41, p = .024, η2p = 0.16), with slightly decreasing sense of
agency for longer delays (specifically, 5.63, 5.51, 5.38 and 5.28 for the increasing delays). We
also observed a main effect of Current trial congruency (F(1,57) = 4.28, p = .043, η2p = 0.070)
with a slightly higher sense of agency for incongruent trials compared to congruent trials (5.51
and 5.38, respectively). None of the other main effects or interactions reached significance.
Block analyses. These analyses were conducted on the MC and MI blocks. We conducted
a 2x2 repeated measures analysis with Block (2 levels: MC and MI) and Current trial congru-
ency (2 levels: congruent and incongruent) as within-subjects factors sense of agency (score on
a scale from 1 to 9), RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) as (separate) dependent variables.
Means and SDs for each of these dependent variables in relation to current and previous con-
gruency are reported in Table 6. The results are also depicted on Fig 6.
Table 6. Means (SD) for sense of agency (rating from 1 to 9), RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in relation to block and current congruency (block analyses).
Block—Current trial congruency
Means (SD) MC_C MC_I MI_C MI_II
Sense of agency 5.51 (2.73) 5.69 (2.60) 5.40 (2.68) 5.60 (2.60)
RT 721 (157.33) 815 (171.56) 747 (148.94) 807 (173.99)
Error rates 3.93 (2.65) 5.27 (5.32) 3.64 (3.65) 4.45 (2.60)
MC_C: congruent trial in an MC block; MC_I: incongruent trial in an MC block; MI_C: congruent trial in an MI block; MI_I: incongruent trial in an MI block.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.t006
Fig 5. Sense of agency ratings (left panel), RTs (middle panel) and error rates (right panel) of Experiment 2 as a
function of previous congruency and current congruency. Dots represent mean RTs for each participant in each
condition (thus, each participant is depicted four times on this graph, once for each Previous × Current Congruency
condition). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.g005
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With regard to sense of agency, we found a significant main effect of congruency (F(1,57) =
6.94, p = .011, η2p = 0.11), indicating that participants reported slightly more agency on incon-
gruent compared to congruent trials (5.64 versus 5.46). The main effect of block did not reach
significance (F(1,57) = 0.42, p = .52, η2p = 0.007), nor did the interaction between block and
congruency (F(1,57) = 0.024, p = .88, η2p < 0.001).
With regard to RT, we found a significant main effect of congruency (F(1,57) = 113.85, p<
.001, η2p = 0.67) indicating that participants were slower on incongruent compared to congru-
ent trials (on average 811ms versus 734ms). Additionally, we observed a significant interaction
between block and congruency (F(1,57) = 5.52, p = .022, η2p = 0.088). This interaction reflects
a typical proportion congruency effect: a decreased congruency effect in an MI block com-
pared to an MC block (60ms versus 94ms). The observation of this proportion congruency
effect ensures that our manipulation of block was successful in order to trigger blockwise adap-
tations. The main effect of block did not reach significance (F(1,57) = 0.56, p = .46, η2p =
0.010).
With regard to error rates, we observed a significant main effect of congruency (F(1,57) =
6.65, p = .013, η2p = 0.10) indicating that participants made more errors on incongruent com-
pared to congruent trials (on average 4.86% versus 3.78%). The main effect of block (F(1,57) =
2.19, p = .14, η2p = 0.037) and the interaction between block and congruency (F(1,57) = 0.50,
p = .48, η2p = 0.009) did not reach significance.
As an exploratory analysis that was not included In our preregistration, we additionally
conducted a 4x2x2 repeated measures analysis with Actual delay (4 levels: 500, 750, 1000 or
1250ms), Block (2 levels: MC and MI) and Congruency (2 levels: congruent and incongruent)
as within-subjects factors on sense of agency ratings (score between 1–9). We observed a main
effect of Actual delay (F(3,55) = 6.32, p = .001, η2p = 0.269), with slightly decreasing agency rat-
ings for longer delays (specifically, 5.77, 5.61, 5.48 and 5.35 for the increasing delays). We also
observed a main effect of Congruency (F(1,57) = 6.61, p = .013, η2p = 0.10), with a slightly
higher sense of agency for incongruent trials compared to congruent trials (5.65 and 5.46,
respectively). None of the other main effects or interactions reached significance.
Post-block subjective effort and agency analyses. With regard to subjective effort experi-
enced during each block (EQ, MC or MI), we conducted a repeated measures analysis with
block (3 levels: EQ, MC or MI) as within-subjects factor on the reported experienced
effort after each block. We observed no significant differences between the three blocks
Fig 6. Sense of agency ratings (left panel), RTs (middle panel) and error rates (right panel) of Experiment 2 as a
function of Block and current congruency. Dots represent mean RTs for each participant in each condition (thus,
each participant is depicted four times on this graph, once for each Block × Current Congruency condition). Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236809.g006
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(F(2,55) = 0.82, p = .44, η2p = 0.029). Indeed, the reported experienced effort was very similar
in the EQ, MC and MI blocks (resp. 4.86, 4.87 and 5.20).
With regard to the subjective sense of agency experienced for congruent, incongruent and
passive trials, we conducted a repeated measures analysis with trial type (3 levels: congruent,
incongruent or passive) as within-subjects factor on the reported explicit sense of agency
after each block. We observed significant differences between the experienced agency over
congruent, incongruent and passive trials (F(2,55) = 48.90, p< .001, η2p = 0.64). Specifically,
participants reported a higher sense of agency over incongruent trials (5.71) compared to con-
gruent (5.03, F(1,56) = 18.78, p< .001, η2p = 0.25) or passive trials (2.63, F(1,56) = 96.65, p<
.001, η2p = 0.63). The explicit sense of agency also differed between congruent and passive tri-
als (F(1,56) = 60.03, p< .001, η2p = 0.52). Note that this effect did not interact with block: a
repeated measures analysis with trial type (3 levels: congruent, incongruent or passive) and
block (3 levels: EQ, MC or MI) as within-subjects factors again only revealed a main effect of
trial type (F(2,55) = 45.32, p< .001, η2p = 0.62).
Discussion
Next to confirming again that our manipulation of cognitive control and our measurement of
sense of agency were successful, we only obtained a small effect of congruency on the sense of
agency, both in the trial-by-trials and the block analyses: incongruent trials received a slightly
higher agency rating than congruent trials. This is in line with the post-block reported explicit
sense of agency in Experiment 1, but contrary to our hypothesis. In the general discussion we
will elaborate this further.
General discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the effect of cognitive effort on sense of agency. We were
interested in shedding light on the contradictory literature about the facilitative or/and detri-
mental nature of cognitive effort on sense of agency. Based on previous studies we suggested
that temporal aspects might determine when effort facilitates or impedes sense of agency. We
formulated concrete hypotheses. First, during a block of trials where effort is required unpre-
dictably, encountering a high-effort trial would lead to a decreased sense of agency on that
same trial, but an increased sense of agency on the next trial compared to a low-effort trial. Sec-
ond, in a block of trials where effort can be anticipated (i.e., frequent high-effort trials), sense
of agency would be increased compared to a block of trials where effort cannot be anticipated
(i.e., scarce high-effort trials). Furthermore, we aimed to explore the effect of cognitive effort
on both implicit and explicit measures of sense of agency. We used a flanker task while also
varying the proportion of conflict present in a block of trials, creating three conditions (MC,
MI and EQ block) in which the required cognitive control (and hence effort) varied.
Our results showed that our manipulations of cognitive control, intentional binding
(Experiment 1) and sense of agency (Experiment 2) were successful. With regards to the trial-
by-trial analyses, and contrarily to our expectations, we observed no decreased intentional
binding or sense of agency on incongruent trials, nor an increased intentional binding or sense
of agency after incongruent trials. Remarkably, in the trial-by-trial analyses of Experiment 2,
we observed a trend towards an increase of sense of agency on current incongruent trials com-
pared to congruent trials (which became significant when actual delay was taken into account).
This increased sense of agency for incongruent trials was also observed in the block analyses of
Experiment 2 and in the post-block analyses of both experiments. With regards to the block
analyses of Experiment 1, we observed a slight trend towards increased intentional binding in
a context where conflict could be anticipated (i.e., MI block) compared to a context where
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conflict was scarce (i.e., MC block). This trend was not present for sense of agency in Experi-
ment 2.
Our results are not in line with previous studies observing lower sense of agency for incon-
gruent compared to congruent trials (e.g. [17,19]). A striking difference between our study
and these previous studies, is the interval between action and outcome and hence when partic-
ipants are asked to introspect about their sense of agency. Previous studies used short intervals
(ranging from 100 to 500ms), whereas our intervals ranged from 500 to 1250ms. We chose
these longer intervals (see also [23]) to be able to use the spacebar Interval Reproduction Task,
as a measure of intentional binding, in Experiment 1. But the moment when sense of agency is
tapped into, might be crucial. After shorter action-outcome intervals, perhaps the experience
of conflict is still predominant, leading to smaller agency ratings on incongruent trials. After
longer intervals, perhaps more metacognitive processes might come into play, leading partici-
pants to reappraise their action as an accomplishment of successfully solving an incongruent
trials, leading to higher agency ratings on incongruent trials. It has already been shown that
conflict experience precedes metacognitive experience, which might only occur at a later time
[32]. In order to further elucidate this, we should include a broader range of action-outcome
intervals in the experimental design.
Interestingly, our results are in line with Damen et al. [33], who, using quite a different free
choice priming task, found that clearly visible incongruent primes increased agency compared
to congruent primes. Based on this observation, another possible explanation for the discrep-
ancy in results might be the exact way in which sense of agency is probed. Both in our study
and the study of Damen et al. [33] we particularly asked participants whether they felt they had
caused the outcome. In contrast, Sidarus and Haggard [17] and Wang et al. [19] asked partici-
pants how much control they felt over the outcome that was triggered by their actions. This
subtle difference in instructions, might have shifted participants’ focus from how much control
they felt (which arguably might be larger for congruent trials) to how much causality they
experienced (which might be higher for incongruent trials which require the overruling of
habitual behavior). A similar argument can be made for the post-block assessment of sense of
agency. In previous studies, participants had to rank the colored circles and rate their sense of
control for each of them after each block of trials. In our study, in contrast, participants
reflected on the extent to which they felt they had caused the colored circles to appear on con-
gruent, incongruent and passive trial specifically. Next to the difference between the focus on
control versus causality, additionally, we specifically highlighted the aspect of congruency
here. This in turn might have led to a reappraisal of their actions in response to the clearly
more difficult, incongruent trials. A follow-up study manipulating instructions might be very
informative with regards to the role of even subtle nuances in sense of agency instructions.
In this study, we departed from the view that sense of agency and effort are tightly related
and that a subjective experience of effort might be a prerequisite for any feeling of agency or
causality. From this, we speculated that experimental manipulations of cognitive effort should
also influence the accompanying sense of agency. However, whether our manipulation of
effort was successful, is doubtful. Although only assessed after each block and only per block
type and not per trial-type, participants reported equal experiences of effort for MC, MI and
EQ blocks in both experiments. Thus, although our manipulation of cognitive control was suc-
cessful (e.g., reduced congruency effects in MI compared to MC blocks, indicative of increased
cognitive control in MI blocks), this might not have been accompanied by differences in expe-
rienced effort. Indeed, the constructs of cognitive effort and cognitive control are not identical,
and the possibility of effortless exertion of cognitive control (i.e., “flow”) has been suggested
[1]. Alternatively, even though it is expected that in an MI block the overall cognitive control,
and hence effort experience, is larger, perhaps the intense effort experienced on the rare
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incongruent trials in an MC block cancelled out the effort differences at the block level. Finally,
it could also be the case that the experienced differences in effort in our experiments were too
subtle to be crudely captured only after a block of trials. Indeed, despite the absence of crude
differences in effort between blocks, we still observed a trend of a difference in intentional
binding between blocks. On the other hand, the lack of clear effort differences between the
blocks, might also explain why our block-based results are minimal. Contrary to what we
expected, we did not find an increased explicit sense of agency in a context where conflict
could be anticipated (i.e., MI block) compared to a context where conflict was rare (i.e., MC
block), but we did observe a slight trend towards increased intentional binding in the MI block
compared to the MC block. These results could be linked to the fact that the MI block probably
was not effortful enough. In any case, replicating the experiments using a task that induces
stronger differences in experienced effort between the different conditions (e.g., Stroop task),
and regularly assessing the experienced effort for different trial types and blocks seems
advisable.
Our findings seem to imply a dissociation between our intentional binding and sense of
agency measures. First, despite no apparent crude difference in experienced effort, the explicit
sense of agency measure was still able to pick up some (trends towards) differences between
experienced sense of agency for congruent and incongruent trials, whereas the intentional
binding measure was not. It could be that intentional binding is a less sensitive measure (espe-
cially when there are no strong differences in experienced effort). Alternatively, the lack of
clear effort differences between congruent and incongruent trials, might also inhibit differ-
ences at the assumed implicit, pre-reflective level of sense of agency, but not the at the explicit
reflective, inferential, belief-like level [28]. Second, across both experiments, the delay between
the action and the outcome had an effect on our measures of sense of agency: participants
showed more intentional binding, but lower sense of agency ratings when the delay increased
(i.e., 500, 750, 1000 or 1250ms). This is in line with previous studies. Temporal binding mea-
sured using interval estimation is typically larger for longer intervals ([18,25,34,35] but see
[26] for the reversed result), whereas higher agency ratings are often found for shorter intervals
[26,36–39]. We are not the first to highlight differences between different measures of sense of
agency (e.g., [25,26]). Recently, Imaizumi and Tanno [26] have suggested that intentional
binding measured using time interval might originate from a different mechanism. Suzuki
et al. [31] even showed that intentional binding might not necessarily reflect sense of agency,
but might be accounted for by multisensory causal binding, without necessarily being related
to intention or agency.
We sought to combine methods typically used in intentional binding tasks, with methods
employed to study the effect of effort on explicit sense of agency. More specifically, in line with
most binding studies (see [40]), we compared an active condition to a passive condition to
assess the baseline level of intentional binding. This differs from previous studies that have
assessed the effect of action selection fluency (effort) on explicit sense of agency, which typi-
cally do not include passive trials (e.g., [17]). While comparing active and passive trials
remains the most common way of assessing intentional binding, it should be noted that this
has been criticised for not adequately controlling for other processes that differ between these
two types of trials (see [40]). In addition, the inclusion of passive trials in our studies, leading
to a clearly felt difference in agency between active and passive trials, might have obscured
more subtle differences between the different active trial types (e.g., congruent and incongru-
ent trials). Therefore, an experiment presenting only active trials might be useful to expose per-
haps elusive differences in agency between active trial types.
The current study examined the effect of cognitive effort on sense of agency using explicit
and implicit measures of sense of agency. We showed that trials requiring the exertion of more
PLOS ONE The effect of cognitive effort on the sense of agency
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cognitive control lead to a higher sense of agency. This result was contrasted to previous stud-
ies to establish potential reasons for this contradictory finding. Future studies should ensure
that conditions are sufficiently effortful, use a broad range of action-outcome intervals and
contrast (even subtle) different ways of probing sense of agency.
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